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1. Introduction 
During the last few decades, the corporate world has been predisposed by the growing 
awareness on CSR and become more conscientious on how they generate and expend 
profits. Currently, firms are more concerned about their ethical and moral behaviour, 
and  their relationship with relevant societal interest groups (Held 1970). It has been 
accepted that firms can gain multiple advantages through  building a positive  image  
among  the  stakeholders, and in establishing social bonds with employees and the local 
community, which generates reputational gains (Branco and Rodrigues 2006; Fombrun 
et al. 2000; Gray et al. 1988; Orlitzky et al. 2003). In practice, those companies who 
implement CSR activities are bound to provide transparent and reliable financial 
information (Kim et al. (2012) and demonstrate a commitment to ethical and 
accountable behaviour (Jones 1995). However, there is an argument that CSR can be 
used as an entrenchment mechanism to achieve managers’ self-interest objectives by 
distorting earnings information (Choi et al. 2013; McWilliams et al. 2006).  
Since earning management (EM) is perceived in the literature as an ethical issue, 
several studies have attempted to explore whether EM and CSR are related. However, 
several studies have found that EM and CRS are negatively related  Alsaadi et al. 
(2017); Chih et al. (2008); Cho and Chun (2016); Choi et al. (2013); Christensen 
(2016); García-Sánchez and García-Meca (2017); Gras-Gil et al. (2016); Kim et al. 
(2012); and Martínez-Ferrero et al. (2016), broadly indicate that firms with strong 
commitment to CSR are less likely to engage in EM. On the other hand Gargouri et al. 
(2010); Jo Hoje and Harjoto (2011); Muttakin et al. (2015); Prior et al. (2008); and 
Scholtens and Kang (2013) found positive relationship between EM and CSR and 
suggest that firms with a higher level of EM resort to CSR activities to disguise 
managerial opportunistic behaviour. Given that the empirical findings remain 
inconclusive, more research is needed to understanding how CSR initiatives can impact 
corporate reporting quality by reducing EM practice (Chih et al. 2008; Gras-Gil et al. 
2016; Grougiou et al. 2014). Accordingly, this study attempts to fill this gap by 
shedding more light on this issue.  Moreover, prior research on this topic has primarily 
focused on the US (Sun et al. 2010), we believe that our study fills this gap of the 
existing literature by examining the effects of CSR activities on EM in the UK. Thus, 
the aim of this study is to explore the impact of CSR on EM using a sample of non-
financial FTSE 350 UK companies during the period 2008 – 2010. Particularly, this 
study investigates whether the level of CSR affects the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals as proxy for EM. Unlike the previous studies, we use multiple measurements 
to capture the level of CSR: content analysis and disclosure index. We measure EM 
based on discretionary accruals using cross-sectional version of Kothari et al. (2005) 
model. Our results suggest that companies with a higher commitment to CSR activities 
are less likely to manage earnings through accruals. Besides, we found that firms with 
higher level of community (COM), employees (EMP), environment (ENV), and 
products (PRO) are less likely to engage in EM via accruals. However, there is no 
evidence has been detected on the levels of CUS and OTH and the EM. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, unlike prior research (e.g. 
Bozzolan et al. 2015; Grougiou et al. 2014; Kim et al. 2012; Martínez-Ferrero et al. 
2015; Martínez-Ferrero et al. 2016; Prior et al. 2008), we use manual measurement for 
the CSR. Prior research on the impact of CSR on EM has used exclusively CSR scores 
provided by CSR score indices (e.g. SiRi ranking index; KLD ranking index; 
FTSE4Good Global). Already existing indices criticized for not provide enough 
information about their methodologies (e.g., Kostyuk et al. 2013; Mitchell et al. 2004) 
and not being fully grounded in the theoretical development of CSR (e.g., Gond and 
Crane 2010; Mattingly and Berman 2006; Rowley and Berman 2000). The manual 
measurement employed in this study for CSR (disclosure index/content analysis) is 
considered to provide a more detailed and precise measure (Haniffa and Cooke 2005; 
Hassan and Harahap 2010).  To the best of our knowledge, such manual measures have 
not been employed in joint studies of CSR and EM. Second, the majority of studies in 
this area are conducted in the context of US (e.g. Grougiou et al. 2014; Kim et al. 2012; 
Yip et al. 2011). Although the UK and the US share some common features, there are 
differences in many ways that could affect the inferences of such research (Toms and 
Wright 2005). For example, US companies are required to disclose more detailed 
information about corporate social activities and corporate governance than are UK 
firms (Lennox 2003). Another area of divergence is the notion of EM practice. In this 
regard, (Brown and Higgins 2001) indicate that the extent to which US managers 
manage earnings is significantly higher than by their counterparts in the UK. For these 
considerations, the present study has a strong incentive to shed more light on the 
potential impact of CSR on EM in the context of the UK.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
relevant theoretical perspectives on CSR and EM. Section 3 outlines the methodology 
and Section 4 report main empirical findings and their consistency with our framework. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. EM and CSR – Differing Perspectives 
In order to explain the link between CSR and EM, previous studies have suggested two 
perspectives. According to the first one, firms with strong commitments to CSR are less 
likely to manage earnings since they do not hide unfavourable earnings realisations and, 
therefore, conduct no EM (Chih et al. 2008). Since EM is perceived as an irresponsible 
act with CSR principles, Choi et al. (2013) argue that firms with strong commitment to 
CSR are more prone to act in a responsible way when reporting their financial 
statements. Likewise, Kim et al. (2012)  point out  that  companies  that  expend  their 
efforts  and  resources  in  designing  CSR programmes  and  implement  these  
programmes  to  address  the  ethical  interests  of stakeholders follow more transparent 
and reliable financial reporting and less likely to manage earnings. Inversely, the 
managerial opportunism perspective suggests that managers who manage earnings may 
strategically use CSR information to disguise their opportunistic behaviour (Prior et al. 
2008). According to Prior et al. (2008), managers who engage in EM may resort to CSR 
to deal with stakeholders’ activism and vigilance (Prior et al. 2008). In line with this 
argument, Choi et al. (2013) argue that managers who act in pursuit of private benefits 
by distorting earnings information are able to entrench themselves through engaging in 
CSR activities. 
 
The empirical studies findings reflected these contradictory perspectives. For instance, 
the studies of Alsaadi et al. (2017); Chih et al. (2008); Cho and Chun (2016); Choi et 
al. (2013); Christensen (2016); García-Sánchez and García-Meca (2017); Gras-Gil et 
al. (2016); Kim et al. (2012); and Martínez-Ferrero et al. (2016) found that EM is 
negatively related to CSR suggesting that  firms with strong commitment to CSR are 
less likely to engage in EM. On the other hand, Gargouri et al. (2010); Jo Hoje and 
Harjoto (2011); Muttakin et al. (2015); Prior et al. (2008); and Scholtens and Kang 
(2013) have found EM and CSR are positively related, suggesting that firms with a 
higher level of EM resort to CSR activities to disguise managerial opportunistic 
behaviour. These contradictory results provide the motivation to look further and shed 
more light on the association between EM and CSR. Furthermore, the study contributes 
to the need for financial transparency and accountability, which may induce managers 
to produce high quality financial reports.  
 
Stakeholder theory offers a beneficial foundation for research into the connection 
between EM and CSR. According to this theory, CSR is seen as obligatory for the firm 
to discharge wider accountability norms by providing information to relevant 
stakeholders (Buhr 2001; Guay et al. 1996). Stakeholder theory is about  groups  and  
individuals  who  can  affect or be affected by  the organization, and  how the 
organizations manage those  groups and individuals (Freeman 1984). The theory further 
views that organizations have a duty and obligation to a wider range of stakeholders 
(Buhr 2001; Guay et al. 1996) and the managers decisions need to incorporate the 
interests of all stakeholders (Grougiou et al. 2014). However, this perspective provides 
a prescription for how managers can undertake strategies to manage and treat their 
various stakeholders; it does not have a direct role in predicting managerial behaviour 
in practice (Deegan 2002). Since the firm is perceived as a multilateral set of 
relationships amongst stakeholders, Grougiou et al. (2014) indicate that since mangers 
attempt to attend a multilateral set of stakeholders objectives, the information 
asymmetry between mangers and stakeholder is high. The existence of information 
asymmetry provides managers an opportunity to practise EM. Further to this, Hoque 
(2006) argues that managers manipulate earnings to improve their private interests at 
the expense of other stakeholders. Moreover, Grougiou et al. (2014); and Sun et al. 
(2010) illustrate that companies that engage in CSR to negotiate diverse stakeholders 
interests are inadvertently expected to practise EM. Thus one can assume a positive 
relationship between EM and CSR in the stakeholder theory framework. 
 
Since the engagement with CSR is one of the management strategies to endorse firm’s 
legitimacy (Grougiou et al. 2014), we looked into the views of legitimacy theory on our 
central issue. Legitimacy theory is perceived as a generalised perception that the actions 
of any entity are desirable within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions (Suchman 1995, p.574), argues that an organisation activities 
must be legitimate in the eyes of society if it is to be allowed to continue its operations. 
Hence, if a company loses its legitimacy, society may revoke its contract and prevent it 
from continuing its operations (Deegan and Rankin 1996; Guthrie and Parker 1989). 
Various strategies that firms can adopt in order to maintain their legitimacy within the 
society in which they operate, and all these strategies can be involved to make social 
disclosure as a means of showing that firms are conforming to society’s expectations 
(Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). Although a firm may choose CSR to maintain or increase 
perceptions of its legitimacy (Patten 1992), it may use this as a means of anticipating 
or avoiding social pressure as well as enhancing the firm’s image or reputational status 
(Gray et al. 1988). In terms of EM, García-Sánchez and García-Meca (2017); and Sun 
et al. (2010) indicate that managers who manipulate earnings tend to realise that CSR 
can be used to maintain the firm’s legitimacy, specifically with social and political 
stakeholders. Thus the CSR is seen as a means of informing stakeholders on the wider 
interests of the firm and of its accountability which prompts the firm to behave in a 
socially responsible manner.   
 
It is also possible that managers would be involved in activities that could indirectly 
harm the company and stakeholders except managers. The separation of ownership and 
management  of a company, together with existence conflicts problem and information 
asymmetry, could create serious problems because mangers are more concerned about 
their job security, rewards, ability to remain in power, and to maximize their own wealth 
(Morris 1987). This incites us to explore the relationship between EM and CSR in the 
framework of an agency theory. Agency problems occur and conflicts arise between 
managers and owners when the managers act for their own benefits rather than 
optimizing the firms’ value from the stakeholders’ viewpoint (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986). Information asymmetry occurs when managers have superior access to the 
information as compared to the owners (Fields et al. 2001). While managers work in 
the firm every day and are knowledgeable about all business transactions and affairs, 
stakeholders, on the other hand, depend on periodic sources of information, such as 
annual and interim reports to enable them to valuate firm’s value. Thus, information 
asymmetry will be higher if the quality of information is low. Managers could 
undertake opportunistic EM to achieve their objectives, which in turn, increasing firm’s 
agency cost. Since agency relationships suffer from the problems of conflict of interest 
and information asymmetry, an optimal solution should be discovered to control such 
problems. Several solutions have introduced in the literature to solve firm’s agency 
problems. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that the transparency and 
accountability system is one of the solutions that should be put in place in order to avoid 
agency problems. Given that financial transparency and accountability are vital to CSR, 
a closure investigation of EM (agency cost) and CSR is required Chih et al. (2008). Jo 
and Kim (2007) argue that EM occur less in companies that disclose more information 
on their social activities, because when the information transparency is increased, it is 
expected that the information asymmetry between managers and investors will be 
decreased, which will enable investors to detect EM. Likewise, Eisenhardt (1989) states 
that “….since information systems inform the principal about what the agent is actually 
doing, they are likely to curb agent opportunism because the agent will realize that he 
or she cannot deceive the principal” (p. 60). Similarly, Shleifer (2004) argue that 
manipulation of earnings occurs less often in corporations with a strong commitment 
to CSR. In addition, Chih et al. (2008) state that a strong commitment to CSR principles 
prevent managers from using their opportunistic discretion over earnings. 
 
Finally, in terms of the signalling theory, Gray (2007) illustrates that firms with high-
quality information tend to use CSR as an alternative to the classical financial reporting, 
while low-quality information companies choose non-disclosure, consistent with 
constrained accounting information. In addition, Gray (2007) argues that the quality of 
company reports is a signal to investors and financial markets that managers are able to 
control social risks within the company. Likewise, Sun et al. (2010) indicate that 
corporate environment disclosure as a part of CSR is a signal to investors and other 
powerful and economic stakeholders that the company is actively taking part in CSR 
and that its market value is in good condition. According to signalling theory, a 
company discloses information to reduce information asymmetry and to signal to 
investors that it is performing better than its competitors (Álvarez et al. 2008; Miller 
2002). However, Hughes (1986) states that the credibility of information provided by a 
firm is an essential element in ensuring lower information asymmetry. Given that EM 
is more likely occurs when information asymmetry is high, signalling theory assumes 
that CSR information is used as a means to reduce the information symmetry (agency 
problem) between companies and their investors. Therefore, based on the notion that 
CSR information is a useful tool for reducing information asymmetry, prior studies 
predicted a negative association between CSR information and information asymmetry 
(Brown et al. 2004; Coller and Yohn 1997; Heflin et al. 2005; Welker 1995), which 
indicates a negative relationship between EM and CSR.   
Given that increasing the level of CSR performance is a possible solution to constrain 
EM through decreasing information asymmetry and conflicts between managers and 
shareholders, the present study employs agency theory to explain the potential 
relationship between CSR and EM.  
H1: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and CSR”. 
The main previous hypothesis is developed to determine the association between the 
total CSR performance and EM. In order to test the association between the CSR sub-
themes (i.e. community (COM), employee (EMP), environment (ENV), products and 
services (PRO), customers (CUS), and others (OTH)) and EM, further six sub-
hypotheses are developed as follows:  
 
H1a: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and COM sub-
score”. 
H1b: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and EMP sub-
score”. 
H1c: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and ENV sub-
score” 
H1d: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and PRO sub-
score”. 
H1e: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and CUS sub-
score” 
H1f: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and OTH sub-
score” 
 
3. Research Design  
3.1 Measurement of Earnings Management 
Discretionary accruals are commonly used to estimate EM in the literature. Similar to 
other previous studies (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995; Jones 1991; Kothari et al. 2005), we 
measure EM based on discretionary accruals using cross-sectional version of the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) due to its superior specification and less 
restrictive data (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Following Kothari et al. (2005), we 
include return on assets (ROA, a proxy for performance) as an independent variable in 
the modified Jones model to control for the impact of firm financial performance on 
accruals.  
For each year and industry, we estimate the following model: 
TAit Ait−1 =∝1 (1 Ait−1)⁄ +∝2 (∆REVit Ait−1 −  ∆RECit Ait⁄ )⁄ +∝3 (PPTit Ait−1)⁄⁄ +
 ∝4 ROAit + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (1)                                                       
Where TAit is total accruals measured as the difference between earnings before 
extraordinary items and cash flow from operations, deflated by beginning total assets 
for firm i in  year t. Ait−1 is the total assets at the beginning of the year for firm i in year 
t.  ∆REVit is the change in revenue between year t-1 and year t for firm i in year t, 
deflated by beginning total assets. ∆RECit is the change in receivables between year t-
1 and year t for firm i in year t, deflated by beginning total assets. PPTit is the gross 
property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t, deflated by beginning total assets. In 
our analyses, we use the absolute value of discretionary accruals (AB_DA) rather than 
signal discretionary accruals, as we are focused on capturing the extent of EM rather 
than the direction of EM since the later can involve either income-increasing or income-
decreasing (Gavious et al. 2012; Klein 2002).  
3.2 Measurement of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Consistent with prior studies, we have used CSR disclosure as an indicator for CSR 
(Lanis and Richardson 2012; Wibowo 2012). Following Haniffa and Cooke (2005), we 
use two types of measures to cupture the level of CSR disclosure, which are, content 
analysis and disclosure index. Content analysis is used to measure the length of CSR 
disclosure (CSRL), while the score of CSR disclosure items is measured by CSR 
disclosure index (CSRI). The reason of using the two mehothds is to captuter the extent 
and the verity of CSR diaclosure (Haniffa and Cooke 2005). 
Content analysis which has been widly used in previous literature as a powerful tool to 
explore corporate disclosures (Aljifri and Hussainey 2007; Aribi and Gao 2010; 
Hussainey et al. 2003), was utilized to gathering and exploring CSRL in the sample of 
this study. In content analysis, the selection of recording units such as sentences, words, 
line, a group of words, pages, paragraph or a whole document are needed. This research 
uses word as a recording unit since words are considered more reliable as a unit of 
analysis compared to longer alternatives (Al-Najjar and Abed 2014; Hackston and 
Milne 1996). Furthermore, Ng (1985) argued that using portion of pages and sentences 
may be inappropriate because column sizes, print sizes, and page sizes may differ from 
one annual report to another. Thus, to overcome these problems the current study uses 
number of words. 
Although slection and deveolpment of disclosure categories into which content units 
can be classified is an essential element of content analysis (Haniffa and Cooke 2005), 
the literature does not provide a clear reference to the categories of CSR disclosure. 
Gray et al. (1995b, p.81) provide four major categories of CSR disclosure (i.e. 
community, employees, natural environment, and customers). However, Deegan et al. 
(2002); Hall (2002); Haniffa and Cooke (2002); Othman et al. (2011); and Rizk et al. 
(2008) have argued that “energy”, “products and services”, “value-added statement”, 
and “others” should be added to the main themes to encompass most of the themes and 
subthems of CSR disclosure. The “others” them is added to capture any elements that 
represent CSR disclosure but fall outside the main and added themes (Gray et al. 
1995b). Before conducting a pilot study, decision rules (see Appendix B) were 
established based on the studies by Hackston and Milne (1996); and Gray et al. (1995b), in 
order to classify which CSR items are to be disclosed under which them and subthem. The pilot 
study process commenced with the downloading of 50 annual reports for the period 2008-2010 
(around 17 annual reports per year and 5 per industry). In the second stage, these reports were  
reviewed  independently  by  two  researchers  followed  by  a  third experienced academic who 
discussed the ambiguities raised in the review. The final researsh instrument was constructed 
to comprises 59 subcategories included within six main themes: environment (ENV), 
employees (EMP), community development (COM), customers (CUS), products and services 
(PRO), and others (OTH) (see Appendix A). 
Similar to the previous studies (Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Othman et al. 2011; Rizk et 
al. 2008), an equally-weighted dichotomous approach based on categorical coding is 
applied in this study to score the disclosure items and develop the disclosure index 
(CSRI). According to this approach, all items included in index checklist are equally 
valued regardless of their importance or relevance to any particular user group (Chau 
and Gray 2002). A dichotomous procedure was conducted whereby an item of 
disclosure was awarded a “1” point if the item of the relevant disclosure included in the 
checklist was disclosed, and a “0” point if it was not disclosed. The corporate social 
disclosure index (CSRI) for each company is estimated as follows: 
 
CSRIjit =  
∑ Xjt
nj
j=1
njit
 
 Where 
CSRI = total score of CSR disclosure; 
      X = takes 1 if an item is disclosed and 0 otherwise; 
       n = the number of items expected, where n ≤ 59; 
j, i and t = the category j for firm i in year t;  
So that 0 ≤ CSRI ≤ 1. 
Reliability and validity refer to a measuring procedure, which provides the same results 
on repeated tries (Aribi and Gao 2010). In this study, special considerations were given 
to reliability and validity. To enhance validity, our checklist themes were carefully 
developed from prior studies. In addition, the items validity of the initial checklist were 
reviewed independently by two researchers followed by a third experienced academic 
who discussed the ambiguities raised in the review. The final checklist includes 59 
items included within six main themes of CSR disclosure. To ensure the reliability of 
the research, the authors and one independent researchers analysed 50 randomly 
selected annual reports. Then, the results from the two researchers were compared. 
However, given that the final research instrument was generally agreed by all 
researchers, the differences in the compliance scores from the researchers were 
insignificant. 
3.3 Empirical Models 
To test the relation between EM and CSR, we estimate the following models: 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑠_𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = α0 + α1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡 + α2𝐵𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + α3𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + α4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + α5𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
α6𝐿𝑉𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 + α7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + α8𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + α9𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ ∝𝑘
𝑛−1
𝑘=1 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖
𝑘 +
 ∑ 𝜔𝑦
2010
𝑌=2008 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑦
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   (2) 
    𝐴𝑏𝑠_𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = α0 + α1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐿𝑖𝑡 + α2𝐵𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + α3𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + α4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + α5𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 +
α6𝐿𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 + α7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + α8𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + α9𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ ∝𝑘
𝑛−1
𝑘=1 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖
𝑘 +
 ∑ 𝜔𝑦
2010
𝑌=2008 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑦
𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (3) 
Where 𝐴𝑏𝑠_𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the absolute value of discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡 
is CSR index for firm i in year t, 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐿𝑖𝑡 is CSR length for firm i in year t. 𝐵𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 is 
board of director’s effectiveness for firm i in year t that takes 1 if 50 per cent or more 
of members on the board of directors are independent and at least a sample median of 
them are financial experts, 0 = if otherwise. 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 is an audit committee 
effectiveness for firm i in year t that takes 1 if all the members on the audit committee 
are independent and at least a sample median of them are financial experts, 0 = if 
otherwise. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of total assets for firm i at at the year-end t, 
𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 is net cash flow from operation divided by the total assets for firm i in year 
t, 𝐿𝑉𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 is Long-term debt divided by total assets for firm i in year t, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is net 
income divided by total assets for firm i in year t, 𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 is market to book ratio for firm 
i in year t, and 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 is a dummy varaible for firm i in year t that takes 1 if the firm net 
income is negative, 0 = otherwise. INDUSTRY is a dummy variable according to 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) and YEAR is a dummy variable that indicate 
fiscal years.      
 
We used the variables to control the potential effect of corporate governance and firm-
specific factors that may influence the extent of EM. With regarding corporate 
governance effect, the study includes 𝐵𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 and 𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 to control its impact on the 
association between EM and CSR.  We have also included several other control 
varaibles in the regression model to control for firm-specific characteristics that may 
affect the level EM. These corntrol variables are: 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 is measured as the natural 
logartim of total assets for firm i in year t, 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 is net cash flow from operation divided 
by total assets, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 is return on assets, 𝐿𝑉𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 is  financial levearge  measured as total 
liabilities scaled by total assets, 𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 is market to book value, and 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 is a dummy 
variable take one if the firm i reported negative net income in year t; and zero otherwise. 
 
Previous studies suggest that the above firm-specific characterstics are useful to predict 
EM (Chih et al. 2008; Hong and Andersen 2011; Kim et al. 2012). SIZE is included in 
the regression to control for a firm size on the EM. There is no agreement in the 
literature regarding the impact of firm size on EM. For example, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1990) argue that  larger companies are more likely to preform downloaded EM. On 
the other hand, Richardson (2000) indicates that the market pressure is greater for larger 
companies because they are subject to close scrutiny by investors, thus they more likely 
to adopt aggressive accounting policies which lead to manage EM upwards. Therefore, 
firm size can be negative or positive associated with EM. OCF 
 was included to control for the differences of performance across firms within different 
industries and economic activity on EM. We expect that firms with a high cash flow 
performance are less likely to engage in income-increasing EM (Dechow et al. 1995). 
ROA is proxy for firm financial performance. It expected the firms with higher financial 
performance tend to manage earnings downwards (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). 
LEVG is used as proxy for debt covenant violation (Elayan et al. 2008). The findings 
of the impact of LEVG on EM were mixes (Dechow and Skinner 2000; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994; Watts and Zimmerman 1990). Therefore, financial leverage can be 
negative or positive associated with EM. MB is included to control for a firm growth. 
It is expected that firms with high growth tend to manage discretionary accruals 
upwards due to they are under the greatest pressure to adopt aggressive accounting 
policies to report increased earnings (Chih et al. 2008). LOSS is included to control for 
financial condition of the firm and expected that firms that faced financial problems 
tend to engage in income-decreasing EM (Healy 1985). Given that the extent of EM 
may differ over time and across industries, we control for time and industry potential 
effect. INDUSTRY is a dummy variable according to Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) and YEAR is a dummy variable that indicate fiscal years.     
 
3.4 Data and sample selection 
The initial sample of the study is UK FTSE 350 index during the period from 2008-
2010. We have restricted the sample period to the immediate aftermath of the financial 
crisis, since the pressures that it caused, are more likely to lead to more pronounced 
practices of EM. We have removed regulated, mining, and financial industries from the 
initial sample due to their unique characteristics and to specific regulations which may 
affect the results (Arun et al. 2015; Astami et al. 2017; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; 
Klein 2002). Further to this, industries less than six observations were reduced from the 
initial sample. Firms with missing data were also excluded from the sample. Therefore, 
the final sample consisted 515 firm-year observations during the period 2008-2010. 
Table I summarises the distribution of the final sample in accordance to Industrial 
Classification Benchmark (ICB).Four main resources were used to collect the data, 
mainly FAME, Thomson One Banker, firms’ annual and, if any, corporate social 
reports. EM and control variables were collected mainly from FAME and Thomson 
One Banker databases, while CSR information was gathered from firms’ annual and 
corporate social reports. Table I shows the sample distribution by ICB classifications 
code. The most heavily represented industry is Industrial Goods & Services (31 per 
cent, ICB code 027), followed by Travel & Leisure (12 per cent, ICB code 057). 
 
 
 
Insert table I about here 
 
 
 
4. Results 
Table II presents the summary of descriptive statistics for all variables. The mean value 
of the absolute value of discretionary accruals (Abs_DA) is 0.044. This result is 
comparable with the previous findings of Rajgopal et al. (1999); and Yu (2008), who 
document that the average value of discretionary accruals in US companies is around 
4.6 and 4.9 per cent respectively. The mean value of CSRI and CSRL are 0.367 and 
1943.351 respectively. For the corporate governance effectiveness variables, Table II 
shows that the mean value of board of directors’ effectiveness (BRDEF) is 0.256, while 
the audit committee effectiveness (AUDEF) has an average of 0.609. These results 
suggest that, on average, 25.6 per cent of UK firms have efficient boards, whereas 60.9 
percent have efficient audit committees. Ho-Young (2008) indicates that the proportion 
of board effectiveness in US companies is 32.65 per cent, whereas the percentage of 
audit committee effectiveness is 34.54 per cent. For the control variables, the mean 
value of cash flow from operation (CFO), financial leverage (LEVG), and return on 
assets (ROA) are 0.135, 0.599, and 0.084 respectively. In addition, Table II reports that 
the mean value of company size (SIZE) is 7.292 and the market-to-book ratio (MB) is 
2.944. It also reports that 13.6 per cent of our sample firms report losses. 
 
Insert table II about here 
 
 
 
 
Table III presents the pairwise correlations for the variables used in the regression. It 
shows that the highest correlation is between CSRI and CSRL with a coefficient of 60 
per cent and significant at 0.01 level. In order to avoid the multicollinearity problem, 
the relation between EM and CSR is separately tested for the two measurements of CSR 
(i.e. number of words and disclosure score).  According to Gujarati (2003), the 
coefficient of ±80 per cent is considered as a begging at which multicollinearity 
problem might exist and harm the results of the regression analysis. Therefore, the 
problem of multicollinearity does not exist between the independent variables used in 
the paper. 
 
 
 Insert table III about here 
 
 
Following Bozzolan et al. (2015); Cho and Chun (2016); Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 
(2010); García-Sánchez and García-Meca (2017); and Gras-Gil et al. (2016), the 
multivariate specifications are estimated using the multiple pooled OLS regression with 
robust standard error to control the heteroscedasticity and serial dependence problems 
that may occur in pooled OLS regression analyses (Petersen 2009).  Using absolute value 
of discretionary accruals, Table IV shows that the score of CSR (CSRI) is negatively 
significant related to EM at (p < 0.01), suggesting that firms with a higher score of CSR 
report lower magnitude of discretionary accruals compared with those firms with a lower 
score of CSR. Similar results are found when we used the number of words (CSRL) as an 
alternative measurement of CSR. In particular, Table IV reports that CSRL is negatively 
significant related to EM at (p < 0.01), indicating that firms with higher level of CSR are 
more likely to engage in lower level of EM. Consistent with H1, this result support the 
prior research  (see e.g. Alsaadi et al. 2017; Chih et al. 2008; Cho and Chun 2016; Choi et 
al. 2013; Christensen 2016; García-Sánchez and García-Meca 2017; Gras-Gil et al. 2016; 
Kim et al. 2012; Martínez-Ferrero et al. 2016), suggestion that CSR constrain company 
ability to manage earnings using accrual based. This perspective is consistent with 
assumption provided by agency theory, which argues that CSR information is an essential 
tool to reduce information asymmetry between managers and shareholders when the 
interests of the two groups conflict. 
 
Insert table IV about here 
 
Further analyses are preformed to examine the rest of our six sub-hypotheses. Therefore, 
we test the link between EM and individual themes of CSR using disclosure score and 
content analysis approaches. These themes are: community (COM), employees (EMP), 
environment (ENV), products (PRO), customers (CUS) and others (OTH). While Panel 
A of Table V report the results based on the disclosure score approach, Panel B presents 
the result based on the content analysis approach. As can be seen from Panel A of Table 
V, there is a negative and significant relationship between EM and COM, EMP, ENV, and 
PRO at (p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.05 respectively), suggesting that firms with a 
high score of COM, EMP, ENV, and PRO are less likely to manage earnings through 
accruals. However, the study finds there is no relation between EM and CUS and OTH 
sub-Scores. These results indicate that the level of CUS and OTH does not impact the 
magnitude of EM.  
Panel B of Table V presents the similar results to Panel A of that COM, EMP, ENV, and 
PRO  have a negative and significant effect on the magnitude of EM at (p < 0.05, p < 0.10, 
p < 0.01, and p < 0.05 respectively). With respect to CUS and OTH themes, Panel B shows 
there is no relation between the themes and EM. The results of Panel A and Panel B of 
Table V are consistent with sub-hypotheses H1a through H1d, however rejecting the two 
sub-hypotheses H1e and H1f. In sum, our results provide evidence suggesting that CSR 
information of community, employees, environment and products seems to play an 
important role in constraining managers ability to manipulate reported earnings through 
accruals compared to those information of customers and others  (Kim et al. 2012). These 
results suggest that UK companies disclose a high level of COM, EMP, ENV and PRO 
information compared with the information of CUS and OTH.  
Insert table V about here 
 
The study uses the lagged values of endogenous independent variable (i.e. CSRI and 
CSRL) as an instrumental variable (IV) to investigate whether or not the simultaneity 
problem affects the relation between EM and CSR. After controlling for endogeneity, 
the coefficient of CSRI and CSRL are negatively and significantly related to 
discretionary accruals as presented in the Table V.I. These results suggest that firms 
with higher levels of CSR report lower levels of discretionary accruals. Although the 
level of significance is different between the main and 2SLS regressions, the results of 
the instrumental variables (IV) 2SLS results are consistent with the main results in 
Table IV. This implies that the simultaneity problem between CSR and EM does not 
affect the primary results of CSR on discretionary accruals.  
  
Insert table VI about here 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the main model to detect EM in this study is Kothari et al. (2005) model,  we 
alternatively use the modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) model as an alternative 
measurement for EM to investigate whether it has any effect on the results. The findings 
are consistent with the main results (see table VII), suggesting that main findings are 
robust with different measurements of EM. 
 
 
 
Insert table VII 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the link between EM practices and CSR in the FTSE 350 
companies in the UK during the period from 2008-2010. We hypothesise that firms 
with high level of CSR is more likely to engage in EM. In order to support/or reject the 
main hypothesis, the study has employed content analysis and disclosure index to 
measure the level of CSR.  
The findings support the main hypothesis that firms with higher level of CSR tend to 
engage in low magnitude of EM through discretionary accruals. The study further 
investigates whether CSR sub-themes and EM are related. The results of empirical 
analysis show that the levels of COM, EMP, ENV and PRO are negatively related to 
the extent of EM, suggesting that firms with a high level of such information report 
lower levels of EM. However, there is no evidence of such a relationship between the 
levels of CUS and OTH and the magnitude of EM, suggesting that the levels of CUS 
and OTH do not affect the level of EM. In order to test whether the primary findings 
are consistent and robust to the specifications of different measures, sensitivity analyses 
are performed, addressed the endogeneity question between EM and CSR. Overall, our 
results are in line with agency theory and consistent with the long-term perspective, 
which asserts that firms issuing a high level of CSR information reduce information 
asymmetry and enhance relationships with stakeholders rather than simply focusing on 
increasing profits. Therefore, CSR activities are motivated by managers' incentives to 
be honest, trustworthy, and ethical. 
The findings of our study provide insights for policy makers, executive managers, and 
academics. Firstly, our study has policy implications for standard setters and regulators 
to continue improving the guidance and framework to assist companies to provide CSR 
reports. Secondly, executive managers may understand the function and importance of 
the CSR in constraining EM and therefore improving financial reporting quality and 
transparency. Managers may refer to this result when they purpose to persuade investors 
and perform CSR activities to reduce earning manipulation and increase investors’ 
wealth. Finally, to the academics, the empirical evidence on the effect of CSR on 
accrual based EM a stepping-stone for future research so that future studies can consider 
the role of voluntary disclosure to reduce real activity EM to protect investors. 
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Appendix A: Checklist of CSD Themes 
Employee 
1. Number of employees 
2. Employee's salary  
3. Health and safety  in the workplace 
4. Employee equal opportunities 
5. Employee benefits 
6. Employee remuneration 
7. Employee's satisfaction 
8. Profit sharing/bonus scheme policy 
9. Employee share ownership 
10. Employee education and training  
11. Accident in the workplace 
12. Other  
 Community 
13. Participation to community activities around the company 
14. Community donations/Charity 
15. Community health supporting 
16. Local community education 
17. Participation in government social campaigns 
18. Awards related to community achievement 
19. Other special community related activities 
Products/services 
20. Product/service development(research and development)  
21. Product safety 
22. Product/service quality 
23. Others 
Customers 
24. Customer services 
25. Customer compliant 
26. Customer satisfaction 
27. Others 
 
Environment 
28. Materials used 
29. Waste 
30. Recycling 
31. Packaging 
32. Water consumption 
33. Conservation of natural resources 
34. Impact in the environment 
35. Designing facilities harmonious with the environment  
36. Repairs/Protection to environmental damage 
37. Energy consumption 
38. Use of waste material for energy production  
39. Development of new sources of energy 
40. Carbon credits 
41. Emission of greenhouse gases 
42. Clean Development Mechanisms 
43. certified Emission Reduction s 
44. Actual environmental policies 
45. Environmental goals, targets and objectives 
46. Compliance with regulations and requirements 
47. Environmental Partnerships 
48. Environmental education 
49. Environmental research 
50. Environmental management 
51. ISOs 14.000 
52. Environmental auditing 
53. Contributions to beautify the environment 
54. Wildlife conservation  
55. others 
Others 
56. General  health  and  safety  information   
57. General   disclosure   of   corporate   objectives /policies relating to the social responsibility of 
the company to the various segments of society  
58. Report about the presence of corporate social responsibility committee and  its members and 
activities 
59. Information  about  awards  received  by  the  company  concerning  its  social responsibility, or 
the presence of the company in one, or more, social indexes  
 
  
Appendix B: Decision Rules for CSD 
1. All CSR information must be related to the firms and its activities.  
2. All disclosures must be specifically stated, they cannot be implied.  
3. If any word has more than one possible classification, the word should be classified as to the 
activity most emphasized in the word. 
4. Any disclosure which is repeated shall be recorded as a CSD word each time it is discussed. 
5. All sponsorship activities to be included, no matter how much it is advertised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
